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Social enterprises are usually serving a broad array of goals. As such, social enterprises are at 
the forefront of a societal trend in most European countries marked by its cross-organisational 
and cross-sectorial character. Social enterprises tend to blur up a number of frontiers between 
the three sectors constituting modern societies. The term ‘social entreprise’ “seems to blur 
exactly those frontiers which have been deliberately constructed – between action for the pub-
lic good and private action, between social action as nonprofits and enterprises as private 
market organisations" (Evers, 2001:296). In Denmark the term "social enterprise" has often 
been used as metaphor for parts of the labour market policy and social policy aimed at in-
creasing the social responsibility of "normal" private enterprises and rarely as a concept for 
combined social/participatory and economic activities within the social economy. Several 
reasons account for the lack of interest for understanding and enhancing the impact of the 
social economy and social enterprises: the lack of legal framework for social co-operatives, an 
inadequate rhetoric and a scepticism towards the combination of ‘social’ and ‘economy’ 
(Hulgård and Bisballe, 2004:4). This is, however gradually changing and both private enter-
prises and the public sector have become much more aware of the potentials and possibilities 
in the concept of social enterprises in Denmark.  
 
Danish social enterprises have often been launched by third sector and local voluntary initia-
tives. The further consolidation has often established restrictions to the public sector and 
therefore the dependence on resources from the public sector is a crucial Danish characteris-
tic. Nevertheless, social enterprises and social economies are important contributors to the 
production of social services and to the promotion of a broad range of integrative activities - 
both integration into the labour market, into everyday life and the civil society. The features 
of social economies in Denmark combine the resource mix and the multiple goal hypothesis. 
Hereby it is indicated that we are dealing with organisations that are difficult to place within 
any traditional framework distinguishing between a private sector acting for private benefit, a 
public sector acting for the public good and a civil sector enhancing forms of solidarity. Fur-
thermore social enterprises often combine different motivational structures and incentives 
with empowerment objectives as well as competence- and skill-building.    
 
A Social Enterprise with a Vague Institutional Configuration 
Building upon a single case study - in the form of an extreme case - concerning the Danish 
social enterprise and social economy ’Broen’ (henceforth: The Bridge) we perform an in-
depth analysis of the institutional configuration, the managerial strategies and evaluations of 
objectives and results and the different agents’ perspectives on participation in the Bridge as a 
social enterprise. The Bridge was a quite successful social enterprise that nevertheless had to 
close down after a number of years due to lack of financial supporti
 
.     
The Bridge was situated in south western Denmark. It was foremost a community project 
aimed at providing different activities for the local community at large. It hosted a second-
hand shop, a textile workshop and a café serving meals at very reasonable rates. The overall 
objective of community building was combined with goals of work integration, pursued 
through hiring people on social assistance and unemployment benefits for different work tasks 
within the organisation. The participants were offered different job experiences, according to 
their own preferences and ability, under the supervision of staff members from the organisa-
tion. The organisation foremost operated as a way of kick-starting individual processes of 
development and qualifications that led to an evaluation of criteria’s for reintegration of par-
ticipants into the labour market or different educational programs. 
 
The Bridge was quite a typical example of Danish social enterprises focusing on socially ex-
posed citizens. It combined a high degree of innovation and creativity with a high degree of 
public subvention and constitutes thus a particular form of social entrepreneurship with both 
strengths and weaknesses. The Bridge combined an innovative drop-in centre for the most 
socially exposed groups in the local area, but it was also an organisation that applied to main-
stream citizens in the local community. At the time when the project was the most dynamic, 
the Bridge consisted of a second hand shop, a workshop on textile work, a rental shop, a café, 
several social re-training initiatives and offers for social welfare recipients and long-term dis-
ability recipients, a regular gathering point for the cultural activities of local Turks and Kurds 
and finally an adult education centre offering courses to elder people. The project provided a 
large group of lonely and worn out people in the local community with a place to expand their 
social network. Due to unemployment benefits and social security, participants were offered 
work experience, job training and competence upgrading closely related to earlier experiences 
and actual preferences. The project also made a small income from sale of products and ser-
vices. This work integration profile is quite typical in Danish social enterprises, combining 
public subvention with workplace integration of marginalised social groups and a minor in-
come (Hulgård, 2004). 
 
The first time the Bridge was facing closure by the local politicians, the manager of the or-
ganisation succeeded, through a personal contact, to get a local Member of Parliament to en-
gage himself in the municipal debate. The manager states:  
”He stirred things up in such a way that the politics of the situation went haywire. What 
was believed ( in the municipal council) to be agreed upon shutting down, they sud-
denly disagreed about. And that saved the place.”   
Thus, the first time round the Bridge was saved, however, not long after problems again oc-
curred and the Bridge never achieved to unfold and consolidate itself as a company before it 
was again facing closure. One structural problem, which could explain this, was the fact that 
the organisation had an extraordinarily high degree of dependence on municipal funds. Ac-
cordingly, 81% of the revenue came from contracts with the public sector. This one-sidedness 
reoccurs when studying the Bridge from a network perspective as shown in the figure below. 
 
Institutional configuration of The Bridge 
                                                                              
 
 
                                                                                        
                                                                 
 
 
 
 
 
Initially, the Bridge was established as a partnership between stakeholders from the public 
sector and local voluntary and educational organisations. The simple relation between estab-
lishment and funding, the large variety of activities such as a café, second hand shop, sewing 
workshop and several other workshops, drop-in centre and different kinds of job training ini-
tiatives and cultural activities plus a mainly public funding, were all factors part of a strong 
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profile but also making the Bridge vulnerable. By using the PCDO model, we can analyse 
how, on a structural and systematic level, four crucial conditions co-operate in social entre-
preneurships. 
 
PCDO model of social entrepreneurship 
 
Austin, Stephenson & Wei-Skillern, 2003:7 
 
Even though the social enterprise was actually successful in the development of a large range 
of deals (D), these were mostly based on contracts and agreements with one sole payer, 
namely the public authorities, in particular the municipality. When the local politicians de-
cided to withdraw their commitment to The Bridge, there was not enough time to reconsider 
the context (C) within which the company was operating for the purpose of developing new 
opportunities (O) and contacts with people and networks (P), which could have lead to new 
agreements. In an introduction to the association’s last general meeting, the former manager 
of the Bridge described how it drained the resources of the project when all their energy had 
to be focused on persuading the local political system and that the Bridge was of great impor-
tance to all the people benefitting from its activities. 
 ”And then we entered the too well known period where all the energy and activities are 
aimed at politicians to once again  inform them of how and why  the Bridge is so impor-
tant for the many people benefitting from what the Bridge offers. We did not succeed in 
getting the centre-right majority in the municipality to at least maintain the decisions 
from just the year before, when we were promised subvention in 2003 and 2004.” 
 (Source: the former web page of The Bridge, which is no longer accessible.) 
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The quotation illustrates the potential vulnerability of social enterprises. When a social enter-
prise is not working with a fully extended access to all four components of the PCDO model, 
it is more likely to have less power of resistance in a time of crisis. The local politicians have 
probably had genuine and legitimise reasons not to renew the agreement, however the case 
illustrates a general experience among local grassroots agents concerning a lack of transpar-
ency and legitimacy in the political decision-making process. 
 
The structural outline of the model indicates initiatives that can change relations between the 
public and the third sector and thus prevent actual legitimacy crises on a local level. In the 
joint commitment and in the agreements about social enterprises and companies, public au-
thorities and voluntary activities could aim to make these social initiatives and companies 
widen the range of relations, agreements, contracts and networks in order to increase the sus-
tainability of the activities. Analyses of the balance between people (P), context (C), deals (D) 
and opportunities (O) contribute in fortifying sustainability in the long run. 
 
Social enterprises as innovative lighthouses 
The purpose in many social enterprises is to bring about productive activities featuring social 
value, often created in the crossing between civil society, private companies and the public 
sector. The social entrepreneurship – as the driving force in social enterprises - differs from 
the commercial entrepreneurship in the fact that it is driven from a wish to obtain social value 
instead of personal or shareholder-oriented value (Austin, Stephenson & Wei-Skillern, 2003). 
In international social science, an entrepreneur is a ’change agent’, regardless of which social, 
political or economical relations are in play. Social entrepreneurs transcend the boundaries 
between the ’economic man’ acting for personal gain and the ’social man’ acting for the 
common good. In Denmark we often see experimental and even unpredictable approaches to 
social changes and these are developed within many areas of society: large parts of the private 
and public labour market, health care, sports, the area of social and human services, housing, 
leisure activities, voluntary work, etc. (see for example: Andersen, Neerup and Cauchi, 2007; 
Andersen & Ploeger, 2006; Hulgård, 2007; Henriksen, et.all. 2007; Juul Kristensen, 2007a,c). 
The creative, effective and innovative processes take place both inside organisations and as-
sociations: as intrapreneurs as well as outside: as entrepreneurs (Juul Kristensen, 2007b,c).  
  
In a Danish context the concept of social enterprise and entrepreneurship embedded in a dy-
namic civil society has been proclaimed to be part of possible solutions of the still unsolved 
complicated problems in the welfare stateii
 
. On the one hand these ambitions hold much po-
tential; on the other hand they are not without problems. Many volunteers do not see them-
selves as solving politics, since only a minor part of the voluntary organisations and volun-
teerism wish to assume the position of spokesmen (Boje, Fridberg & Ibsen, 2006). At the 
same time, it appears as though private/public partnerships are not leaving the third sector 
unaffected and untouched but can lead to changes in the volunteer composition, in the particu-
lar organisational structures chosen and in the activities and profiles of volunteerism (Lund-
strom & Wijkstrom, 2002; Kildal, 2000). In Denmark critical analyses have identified a ten-
dency to top-down management and an increased focus on classical professionalism, which 
might contradict volunteerism that traditionally grows bottom-up with strong roots in popular-
ism and independent administration (Lihme, 2000). 
A Danish Culture of Experiments 
The growing interest in social entrepreneurship and social enterprises is historically rooted in 
a specific Danish culture of experiments and developmental work. Throughout the 1980s and 
1990s, the decade of the experimental strategies (the 1980s) was established and was soon to 
be followed by the decade of selective funds (1990s), all in all constituting a distinctive Dan-
ish culture of innovation. In the 1980s, more than 1 billion Danish kroner (DKK) were spent 
on experimental projects within the cultural, social and health care areas. The money came 
mainly from public funds and programmes and to a lesser degree from private foundations. 
These experimental programmes turned the focus to the development of local solutions. Dur-
ing these two decades, there has been a significant development in the discourse concerning 
social developmental initiatives, which has fundamentally defined the Danish discourse and 
practice for experimental projects and innovation. Among other things, considerable resources 
were given to the area of social housing, the employment area, efforts for troubled children 
and teenagers, to help-needing families, different groups amongst disabled and elders, to 
fundings within the area of narcotics and to improve the conditions at psychiatric hospitals 
and institutions for the homelessiii. The rearmament of the fund contributions in the 1990s was 
to a significant degree related to the highly increased economical resources established via a 
political decided ‘social tax’ from 1990, which was entered by a broad majority of the politi-
cal parties in the Danish parliament at the time and has been in function ever since iv
  
. 
From an international perspective, a discourse on social entrepreneurship and social economy 
emerged on the international scene in the 1990s. This discourse corresponded significantly 
with the Danish tradition for socio-economic and welfare political experiments. However, it 
remained interestingly unreflected and relatively unknown in the Danish context, even though 
neighbouring countries such as Sweden and Great Britain were deeply affected by the new 
discourse, also on a political level. Whether the current focus on social entrepreneurship 
might result in the reinforcement of local experimental activities cooperating with regional 
and central authorities in innovative and transgressing processes is difficult to judge. The way 
the socio-political and welfare discourses are employed at present, one could fear that a de-
velopment within a methodology accentuating standardisation by means of central target 
management, best-practice formulas and the like having for instance cost reduction purposes 
could gain ground. If this should happen at the expense of the more open and enquiring ex-
perimental activities, it is a critical development. Thus there is a great challenge in maintain-
ing and developing the open and enquiring approach of the experimental culture – not least in 
a decade that could be labelled the period of social entrepreneurship. 
 
Innovative organisational development 
Our initial analysis of the case study has shown that social enterprise calls for managing a 
patchwork of complicated issues. Organisational, managerial and pedagogic perspectives hold 
a central position often to be solved at the same time. Social enterprises in work integration 
must be established with a starting point in a social problem or a local need and supported by 
a voluntary commitment and foundation that both represents the incorporated resources that 
social enterprises benefit from as well as the risks involved. They have to quite fast to estab-
lish sustainable organisational structures and activities, which are suited both for their poten-
tial users/employees and the volunteers and which also employ a contemporary modern or-
ganisation. They have to create possibilities for member-based democracy giving influence 
and voices to different users, employees and volunteers, but also manage a reasonably effi-
cient organisation. They have to be able to describe and assess their activities and be capable 
of reflecting on their theory of change on which basis they are working. And finally they 
should preferably establish partnerships and long-term cooperation with public authorities and 
preferably also private companies. Thus, social enterprise necessitates expertise, competences 
and network – in addition to voluntary manpower. 
 
But a social enterprise also provides a stimulating starting point for a flexible and innovative 
development of an organisation that is able to address the users’ needs and adapt to new chal-
lenges and objectives. The manager clearly stated that the many opportunities for business 
development not inhibited by regulations or legal procedures to be followed led to a more 
inventive and entrepreneurial culture.  
“The positive about this place relates to our affiliation. If we come up with new ideas then we 
are free to implement these – it we have the funding. If we want to do an excursion or another 
new initiative we can do it. Nobody controls us. I refer to the board and that’s it. The ad-
verse effect on the running of the Bridge is about the limited financial resources. Some 
of our ideas – for instance if we would like to have the local people to join us for a 
dancing evening every week, we are not able to do this due to our economy. Or if we 
would like to give lectures then we need to be able to provide money for that too.”   
However, the Bridge was seriously affected by the vague and non-supportative business and 
organisational set-up. Potential conflicts with the local private enterprises, lack of long term 
commitment from the public sector and a huge work load all over time drained the manager, 
her staff and volonteers for the necessary energy and drive.  
”We have had some income increase. We did a new enterprise where we did theatre 
make up. We had a significant increase the first year, but the second year stagnated be-
cause we had emptied the market. Our rental shop has its ups and downs depending on 
how much PR we do. We have been somewhat cautious because we worry that someone 
would accuse us of distortion of competition. The private enterprises are not very happy 
with us. Many local social enterprises have had such problems. They are not very likely 
to help social enterprises that aim at getting individuals in job-activation. They see us 
as competitors getting funded by the public. So the director of the local labour market 
administration has offered his help if such a case should turn up.” 
 The manager pictured the Bridge like a house of cards – it didn’t take much of an effort to 
make it collapse. The necessary resources that any business needs to invest in innovative de-
veloping are coerced into licking the wounds after the latest struggle. It was a continual ex-
perience that when the Bridge felt afloat the authorities again reminded them that they were 
only on the drawing board. A more long-term commitment - 4-6 years - based on several 
partners would have been a fare more rational and adequate social agreement.     
 
Management  
The manager at the Bridge described how she at first had too high (emotional) expectations 
for the employee and users that she have had to readjust.    
”In my early days in this project I thought that we could turn it into some kind of after-
school centre displaying an emotional sense of belonging. But I gradually learned that I 
became quite disappointed when people left the place or didn’t accept what was of-
fered. That was because I didn’t realize that I was in fact the employer. Even though I 
in person don’t pay their wage. I provide good working conditions, some funny experi-
ences given that I, as a person, run these things here. Or that I am in front of it all. I 
truly don’t believe that a public business and the like would take on the tasks that I 
sometimes have to do. But that is a part of the way things work here. This is why I am 
not only the boss. I am just as much a social worker.”  
The managerial profile unfolded in the interview illustrates the clashes of several management 
philosophies and practices. The visible and authoritative manager stand out distinctly, given 
that the manager seemed to function through her physical, moral and personal presence. The 
manager appeared to be a good role model – a lighthouse taking the lead – not the least when 
problems arise or crises were under way. When the manager was absent, the teamwork and 
focus in different project-activities immediately weakened – and this constituted a serious 
problem because the Bridge wished to work with empowerment of its users. However, the 
manager also positioned herself as a different manager: a hybrid between a social worker and 
a manager. She had the ideal of making use of a delegating and democratically management 
style, which faced quite a number of difficulties in its realisation since the user and volunteer 
group was of a very complex composition and not everyone could fulfil the demands this 
raised. Managing a social enterprise consisting of work integration, voluntary activities, 
community-related activities, a café, etc. involved quite an amount of professional invest-
ments, relational work as well as emotional and personal interaction (Andersen, 2001; Lund-
gaard Andersen, 2005). All these components were crucial for the quite positive outcome the 
Bridge was able to turn out.   
 
Sustainability 
Social enterprises with a strong interface of volunteerism have a distinct focus on participa-
tory democracy and member influence and these features are also characteristic for the 
Bridge.  Enterprises like the Bridge depend on different forms of sustainability. Social sus-
tainability denotes the social adhesive tying different agents from the voluntary organisation, 
from the staff and the local citizens together thereby constituting the basis for reproducing and 
developing their future profile of activities. Local sustainability ensures a continued local in-
terest from a differentiated group of local agents that have to support the social enterprise to 
secure growth. Whereas project sustainability implicates reliable user needs towards the social 
enterprise. In the case of the Bridge, the social, local and project sustainability was fairly well 
anchored, whereas the weakness was the economical sustainability (Lundgaard Andersen, 
Neerup & Cauchi, 2007). However, also the social sustainability faced some difficulties. The 
manager described how the level of activity dropped, the minute she was absent. The users, 
employees and the volunteers had difficulties developing and maintaining responsibility when 
the manager was not present. But the manager also described this phenomenon within a long 
developmental horizon, which she consistently applied on objectives, working methods and 
participants of the Bridge. She spoke of the Bridge as individual and professional develop-
mental processes of users, employees and volunteers, stressing the necessity of developing a 
labour identity, daily work practice and hereby creating an inclusive but also productive 
workplace. The concept of the Bridge embraced various conceptual practices: the develop-
ment of a socio-political awareness and knowledge, ‘enlightenment’ and cultivation in the 
Danish learning tradition of Grundtvig, empowerment and democracy, competence develop-
ment, professional training and personal growth. This complicated encounter encompassing a 
multitude of users, employees and volunteers therefore accentuates a process perspective jux-
taposed with a product perspective – and the manager precisely points to the complicated 
business when trying to outline performance indicators and measurement standards. 
 
The institutional practice also included the concept of ’public governance’, where various 
groups of citizens, professionals, public authorities and private companies work as negotiating 
agents in the development and evaluation of specific political and practical arenas (Bovaird & 
Löffler 2003; Bovaird, 2005). The Bridge was part of a series of continuous discussions and 
negotiations with the local administration concerning the implementation of the labour market 
and employment objectives for the municipality. Thus, the Bridge was engaged in governance 
processes planning, negotiating and evaluating specific products of social services and was in 
the initial phases of developing a public-private partnership.    
 
Agents: users, volunteers and professionals 
The Bridge had a broad and varied group of users, volunteers and employees. The different 
activities attracted both socio-economically disadvantaged as well as advantaged individuals 
and were thus able to establish an unusual learning space with a mix of different participants. 
The manager described it this way:  
”The Bridge is incorporated in what is known as the Danish tradition of a ’Folkehus’ 
(People’s house) bringing the atmosphere and group identity specific to this. Then we 
are a ’community house’ for the local people as well. And this is an obstacle. When 
people join us and want to be part of the Bridge, they are immediately faced with the 
many practical functions. For one thing to make this café work every day…what hap-
pens is that they quickly become volunteers. In reality they are users. But the individual 
person feels better when being a volunteer. This means that some of the newcomers at 
once become part of the staff - whereas others become users when they use the sewing 
workshop to sew their clothes. Some would want to fix something; others would want to 
learn something. All in all around 54 persons enter the house every day.”  
The social enterprise applied quite a sophisticated understanding of the dynamic balance be-
tween users’ in passive and consuming positions versus volunteers in active and creative posi-
tions. Apparently, the Bridge had composed their activities in ways that in a logical and 
straight forward way facilitated newcomers to transcend the borderline between the ‘takers 
and the givers’. Thus, the Bridge had developed an activating and co-creative social learning 
space, which in its culture and in its economical overall plan, in its opportunities of activities, 
its engagement, its community and its individual focus has provided many participants with a 
range of opportunities for personal end professional development (Andersen and Ahrenkiel, 
2003). 
 
The importance of linking work integration with volunteerism relates to the possibilities of 
motivating the clients and for the intentional profile of social enterprise.  
“One thing is that it looks good on the paper to have volunteers. Another thing is that it 
is an essential moral message to send to the activated clients: that some individuals ac-
tually are here of their own free will. Even though the clients don’t pose the attitude 
that this is forced labour- there is an element of force in it. So the fact that the clients 
see that many volunteers slaves – just like me but that is different – and that the volun-
teers never have a sick day! That makes an impression.” 
The demanding outcome objectives also lead to further problems and challenges. A differenti-
ated group of participants covering long-term benefit recipients in retraining, early retirement 
pensioners eager to learn, autonomous citizens with creative hobbies and citizens from differ-
ent ethnic minorities – all necessitates a differentiated and adapted pedagogical, collaborative 
and professional strategy. On the one hand this was brought to a considerable amount of suc-
cess. On the other hand such an elaborated strategy and activity-profile required a certain 
amount of employee stability, of quality-assessment, of voluntary commitment and an eco-
nomically viable structure. The ability of social innovation and user-participation was the 
greatest asset of the Bridge, However, the turmoil of everyday life didn’t provide the re-
sources and the time to further develop the innovative combination of volunteerism, work 
integration and service production. Unfortunately then, the social enterprise was not able to 
develop their core output and it quickly turned out that also organisational, economical and 
network structures were just as important. 
 
Professionalism  
Furthermore, it is interesting to identify the interplay between the theory of professions and 
the professional bodies and the more popular dimensions of the ideology, knowledge base and 
practices at the Bridge. Classic definitions of theory of professions and theory of science point 
out that formal knowledge acts as legitimatization and provide access to certain job positions, 
privileges and wage levels. The educational system provides the individuals with diplomas 
and certificates as well as develops a professional identity where the individuals acquire a 
knowledge base for professional work activities (Salling Olesen 2001; Salling Olesen & We-
ber, 2001; Hjort og Weber, 2004). This definition, however, is not adequate when defining 
social enterprise since these organisations in their structural foundation and work division 
transcends the classic professional categories and definitions. Social enterprise and social en-
trepreneurship is a much more hybrid phenomenon encompassing different occupations, man-
agers, autodidacts, clients, users and citizens in patchwork of paid and unpaid positions. The 
hybrid of professional and voluntary social work in social enterprise is more adequate identi-
fied and discussed on the basis of five conditions inspired by theory of professions: 1/ the 
proportions of paid employees, 2/ the defined methodical approaches, 3/ an occupational 
community among the employees and volunteers, 4/ competency development of employees 
and volunteers and 5/ development of the organisation’s own visibility towards users, the pub-
lic and private sector and other voluntary associations. The Bridge had paid employees: the 
manager and partially a few others as well, it was founded on several defined pedagogical, 
social and community approaches, it had an approach that was inspired by enlightenment and 
critical pedagogy, combined with an empowerment approach attempting to create a space of 
critical social and vocational learning and training leading to social and critical understanding 
and conduct. The most significant weakness was probably the lack of visibility towards a 
broader range of external agents – that had a significant effect on their ability of survival. 
 
Social Enterprise in Denmark 
The case study analysis – and the larger picture of work integration social interprises in Den-
mark - clearly demonstrates how social enterprises in Denmark find themselves in a paradox. 
On the one hand they have had quite a success addressing complicated welfare state problems 
in the guise of marginalised individuals on the edge of society. They have developed adequate 
methods, incentives and results – that are client-sensitive, professional viable, market ma-
noeuvrable and financially reasonable. On the other hand they are not provided with access to 
adequate structural, financial, political and organisational conditions and partnerships. It is 
natural to understand this as the shady side of the Danish experimental project culture in the 
sense that the public sector not yet have faced the challenge and the responsibility that public-
private partnerships including the civil society implies. The analyses then, points to how the 
third sector’s institutional capacity in Denmark is fare from developed into viable models 
abreast of the capacity that the existing social enterprises are capable of. The social enter-
prises are faced with the dilemma to navigate between two business models: to be partly re-
ferred to and evaluated by the for-profit model on the non-profit condition.      
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i The case is based on empirical data stemming from a research project by Lars Hulgård and Thomas Bisballe, 
who in 2004 served as one of several sub-projects in the European research project EMES studying social enter-
prises and social entrepreneurship in a number of European countries. Several interviews were conducted with 
the manager of the Bridge focusing on the enterprises’s social capital and the importance for its activities, devel-
opment potential, local and national strategy, group of participants and group composition, local and private 
partners and the organisation’s conceptual basis. 
 
ii The Danish Ministry of Education estimates the number of voluntary organisations in Denmark to be more than 
83.000 local associations, 6.200 foundations, just under 8.000 independent organisation and about 3.000 national 
organisations. A third of the Danish population carry out volunteer work (see Danmarks strategi for livslang 
læring, April 2007).   
 
iii This happened f.ex.on the basis of initiatives in the City Council, of which also immigrant policy objectives 
were a part as well as issues concerning the unemployment policy, such as the inclusive labour market, different 
re- training initiatives, etc. Thus in the middle of the 1990s, calculations showed that the Ministry of Social Af-
fairs in the period of 1994-97 managed a total fund of money with a margin of expenditure of 1.374 billion Dan-
ish kroner (DKK). This implies that in the period of just four to five years in the 1990s, more funds were spent 
on experimental and developmental projects within the socio-political sphere than the total funds spent in the 
’decade of experimental strategies’. 
 
iv Every year, 0.3% of the annual revalorization of the transfer incomes are frozen from the direct disboursement 
to the recipients for the benefit of a ’social tax’, which is distributed every year in agreement among the parties 
involved in the political accord in the Danish parliament. With a modest beginning in 1992-93, the Ministry of 
Social Affairs’ share of these funds had reached almost 900 million Danish kroner in 1995, which through an 
integrated automatic control was increased to approximately 1.5 billion DKK in 1997 and approximately 2.9 
billion DKK in 2000 and so on. Thus in 2000, the Ministry of Social Affairs had 1.162 billion DKK at their 
disposal from the ’social tax’ to be used for different, more or less fixed funds, central and local initiatives, 
grants for running expences of individual initiatives, etc. Adding to this was a pool of about 300 million DKK 
from the regular Finance Act plus funds from the State football pools and lottery allocated for social purposes. 
 
 
